Resolution Criteria:

The question resolves TRUE if, on or before December 31, 2028, any of the following entities:

- United States: the President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense, National Security Advisor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or Commander of a Unified Combatant Command;

- Israel: the Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, National Security Advisor, or Chief of the General Staff (IDF);

issues a clear and unambiguous threat to use nuclear weapons against Iran.

To count, the threat must meet all of the following conditions:

1. Sufficient Clarity: The statement must be reasonably interpreted as an intentional and direct threat to use nuclear weapons—not just general or ambiguous language about “all options” or “severe consequences.”

- For example, statements like “We are prepared to use nuclear weapons if Iran proceeds with X” or “We will consider a nuclear strike against Iran’s facilities” would likely qualify.

2. Public or Credibly Reported Diplomacy:

- The threat must be issued either publicly (e.g., in speeches, press conferences, interviews, official publications, or verified social media accounts),

or through diplomatic channels that are later revealed by reasonably reliable sources.

3. Target Specificity:

- The threat must be clearly directed at Iran—not a general doctrine shift, a hypothetical scenario, or a restatement of nuclear policy that isn't clearly directed at Iran.

4. Temporal Requirement:

- The statement must occur on or before December 31, 2028, regardless of whether the use of force ever materializes.

The question resolves FALSE if:

- No qualifying threat is made by a listed official within the time frame.

- Only vague language such as “all options are on the table” is used without further clarification.

- The threat is issued by a lower-level official not listed in the criteria.
Special clause — Use Without Prior Threat:
- If either the U.S. or Israel uses a nuclear weapon against Iran on or before December 31, 2028, the question shall resolve TRUE, regardless of whether a qualifying threat was made beforehand. The act of use constitutes the clearest possible indicator of nuclear intent.